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145 orders from the Himachal Pradesh High Court.
Most recent orders on record, 2022–2025.
The High Court held that an assessee undertaking substantial expansion of a unit eligible for 100% deduction under Section 80-IC can claim the same 100% deduction on profits from the expanded unit, even if it's beyond the initial five-year period. The Supreme Court's decision in Aarham Softronics was cited as binding.
The High Court condoned the delay in filing the appeal and set aside the ITAT's orders. The ITAT was directed to decide the appeal on its merits.
The High Court held that the provision for leave encashment was not an admissible deduction for the relevant assessment year. The insertion of Section 43B(f) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which requires actual payment for such deductions, applied prospectively and regulated the deduction.
The High Court found that the factual matrix of the case was not adequately discussed by the lower authorities. Therefore, the matter was remanded to the Commissioner of Income Tax for a fresh decision after considering all aspects.
The High Court held that the assessee had a reasonable and bonafide cause for the delay in filing the return, as accepted by the appellant on facts. Therefore, the assessee should not be burdened with taxes it is otherwise not liable to pay.
The High Court found that the ITAT had wrongly noted the date of filing of the miscellaneous application. Considering the Supreme Court's order on condonation of delay due to the pandemic, the application was within the prescribed time. Therefore, the ITAT's order rejecting the application was set aside.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were initiated on a mere change of opinion, which is not permissible. It also found that the assessee had utilized funds exceeding the 85% threshold for charitable purposes, satisfying the conditions for exemption under Section 11.
The Tribunal held that the reassessment proceedings were initiated on a mere change of opinion, which is not permissible. It also found that the assessee had utilized funds exceeding the 85% threshold for charitable purposes, satisfying the conditions for exemption under Section 11.
The Tribunal held that the Excise and Taxation Department would not be liable to pay the tax if the toll lessees had already paid income tax on their earnings. However, the department would be liable to pay interest on the short-deducted TCS.
The Tribunal held that the Excise and Taxation Department would not be liable to pay the tax if the toll lessees had already paid income tax on their earnings. However, the department would be liable to pay interest on the short-deducted TCS.
The Tribunal held that the Excise and Taxation Department would not be liable to pay the tax if the toll lessees had already paid income tax on their earnings. However, the department would be liable to pay interest on the short-deducted TCS.
The Tribunal held that the Excise and Taxation Department would not be liable to pay the tax if the toll lessees had already paid income tax on their earnings. However, the department would be liable to pay interest on the short-deducted TCS.
The Tribunal held that the Excise and Taxation Department would not be liable to pay the tax if the toll lessees had already paid income tax on their earnings. However, the department would be liable to pay interest on the short-deducted TCS.
The Tribunal held that the Excise and Taxation Department would not be liable to pay the tax if the toll lessees had already paid income tax on their earnings. However, the department would be liable to pay interest on the short-deducted TCS.
The Tribunal held that additions to the extent of peak credit in bank accounts were justified, and that construction expenses and investment expenses are distinct. The High Court found no substantial question of law and dismissed the appeals.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was required to tax the interest on sticky loans/NPAs on a receipt basis. This was based on the interpretation that the amendment to Section 43D of the Income Tax Act, 1961, extending its scope to cooperative banks, was curative and retrospective in nature.
The Tribunal held that the assessee was required to tax the interest on sticky loans/NPAs on a receipt basis. This was based on the interpretation that the amendment to Section 43D of the Income Tax Act, 1961, extending its scope to cooperative banks, was curative and retrospective in nature.
The Tribunal held that the AO's rectification was based on a misappreciation of facts and that there was no mistake apparent from the record. Therefore, the CIT(A)'s order was not to be interfered with.
The Tribunal held that Unit-III was a separate and distinct unit, entitled to deduction under Section 80-IC. The High Court found the Tribunal's decision was not perverse and was based on material on record.
The High Court held that the ITAT had failed to consider the object and purpose of Section 80IC, which was to promote industrial development in backward areas. The Court found that the ITAT's conclusion that the assessee was involved in 'manufacture' or 'production' was reached without adequately considering the very small quantum of work performed at the Parwanoo unit relative to the entire production process. The Court noted that the AO had identified that only threading, assembly of nuts/washers, and asphalt coating were done at Parwanoo, while processes like drawing to size, heat treatment, straightening, and cleaning were outsourced to Ludhiana. The High Court viewed the interpretation of 'manufacture' or 'produce' in Section 80IC as a mixed question of fact and law that required consideration of the legislative intent. Consequently, the impugned orders of the ITAT, to the extent they held the assessee involved in 'manufacture' or 'production' without considering the limited work done at Parwanoo, were set aside. The appeals were remanded back to the ITAT for fresh adjudication.
The High Court held that in view of the submission made by the learned counsel for the respondent that the impugned order of the ITAT had been recalled and a fresh adjudication was done vide order dated October 11, 2019, the present appeal was rendered infructuous. The Court noted that a copy of the subsequent order was placed on record. The appellant was granted liberty to challenge the order dated October 11, 2019, if so advised. Pending miscellaneous applications were also disposed of. The ratio of this decision is that an appeal against a recalled order becomes infructuous if a fresh adjudication has occurred and the aggrieved party is at liberty to challenge the new order.
The High Court dismissed the present appeal. The reasoning for dismissal is based on a previous decision of the same Court dated 28.03.2022, wherein similar appeals filed by the Revenue against the same impugned order of the Tribunal (dated 02.11.2018) for different assessment years were dismissed. The Court found that the present appeal was identical in nature to those previously dismissed. Therefore, the principle of precedent dictated that this appeal should also be dismissed. No specific findings were made on the merits of the assessment year 2010-2011, as the dismissal was procedural, based on the prior judgment. The operative direction was to dismiss the appeal.
The High Court found no merit in the appeal filed by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions). The Court noted that the respondent had been running a school for 34 years in rented premises and that the funds were being saved with a view to acquiring its own building in the future. Given the long operational history, the Court held that it could not be alleged that the institute had a profit motive. The Court also acknowledged that the respondent is running the school in rented premises, making it within its rights to create funds for constructing its own building. Consequently, the learned Tribunal was deemed to have rightly allowed the appeal filed by the respondent. The Court did not expressly leave any issue undecided. The operative direction was the dismissal of the appeal.
The High Court permitted the withdrawal of the appeals. The reasoning provided is that the learned counsel for the appellant(s) submitted a request for withdrawal, stating that the parties had amicably settled their disputes under the Direct Tax Vivad Se Vishwas Act, 2020. The Court ordered accordingly. The operative direction is the permission to withdraw the appeals. No issues were decided on merits, and no specific findings were made on any substantive tax law provisions.
The Tribunal rightly held that Unit-III was a separate and distinct unit, entitling the assessee to the deduction under Section 80-IC, as it operated from a different building, had separate employees, and maintained distinct accounts.